

A United Nations Peacekeeping Mission Tested to its Core: UNIFIL on the Verge of Needing an (Even) More Robust Mandate?

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Abstract

Pursuant to Art. 1(1) of the Charter of the United Nations, one of the purposes of the United Nations is the maintenance of international peace and security. It was within this objective that the United Nations created the concept of peacekeeping operations amid the Cold War. Following the adoption of Resolution 377(V) (1950) by the United Nations General Assembly, the United Nations Emergency Force in the Suez (UNEF I) was established as the first peacekeeping operation in 1956. The United Nations Security Council followed this precedent in 1960 with Resolution 143 (1960) and the establishment of the United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC). These initial operations have been followed by numerous others, one of which is the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). First established by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426 (1978), the mission has been pursuing the objective of restoring international peace and security in the southern part of Lebanon for over four and a half decades, concurrently facilitating the re-establishment of effective Lebanese control over the region. Given the intensification of hostilities between the Israel Defense Forces and Hezbollah in Lebanon in late 2024, UNIFIL has once again been placed in a challenging position. In light of these recent developments, the question arises whether the mandate of UNIFIL should be amended to a peacekeeping operation pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter and further if it should be empowered to use force proactively, meaning offensive use of force – i.e., departing from the inherent defensive nature of peacekeeping operations. The article argues that UNIFIL would be better placed to attain the objectives of its mandate by maintaining a neutral position in the region, thus refraining from an amendment of the mandate pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the proactive application of force.

A. Introduction

Pursuant to Art. 1(1) of the United Nations Charter (UNCh)¹, one of the purposes of the United Nations (UN) is the maintenance of international peace and security. Within the framework of this objective, the UN, especially the UN Security Council (UNSC) and later the UN General Assembly (UNGA), established the concept of peacekeeping operations (PKOs). One such operation is the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In spite of the factual situation in southern Lebanon, UNIFIL has thus far proven to be one of the longest enduring UN PKOs.² First established by UNSC Resolutions 425³ and 426⁴ (1978), the mission has been pursuing the objective of restoring international peace and security in the southern part of Lebanon, concurrently facilitating the re-establishment of effective Lebanese control over the region.⁵ Given the prevailing instability in the region, UNIFIL has thus far been unable to fulfil the objectives set forth in its mandate, which has not been significantly amended since 2006. The intensification of hostilities between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah in Lebanon since October 2024 has once again placed UNIFIL in a challenging position. The developments give rise to the question whether UNIFIL should

- 1 Art. 1(1) UNCh states, ‘To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.’
- 2 V. Newby, *Peacekeeping in South Lebanon: Credibility and Local Cooperation* (2018), 58.
- 3 SC Res. 425, UN Doc. S/RES/425, 19 March 1978.
- 4 SC Res. 426, UN Doc. S/RES/426, 19 March 1978.
- 5 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), ‘UNIFIL Background’, available at <https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-background> (last visited 16 January 2025); M. Williamson, ‘The Lebanon War – 1982’, in T. Ruys & O. Corten (eds), *The Use of Force in International Law* (2018) 284, 284; UNIFIL, ‘UNIFIL Mandate’ (2019), available at <https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-mandate> (last visited 16 January 2025).

be amended to a PKO pursuant to Chapter VII of the UNCh (Chapter VII) and further if it should be empowered to use force *proactively*, meaning *offensive* use of force (i.e., departing from the inherent *defensive* nature of PKOs).

Having this in mind, the following article seeks to determine whether based on the latest developments the mandate of UNIFIL should be amended to empower the PKO to utilize force *proactively*. To achieve this objective, an analysis of UN PKOs is conducted, including their authority to use force and its potential applicability to the mandate of UNIFIL. The article accordingly proceeds as follows: the initial section discusses the legal classification of the concept of peacekeeping within the UN system. The second section focuses on the scope of the permissible use of force in the context of PKOs. This general discussion of PKOs is followed by an historical and legal assessment of UNIFIL. The final section addresses the modification of UNIFIL's mandate in light of the hostilities since autumn 2024.

B. Peacekeeping and the United Nations

“There is no definition for what [peacekeeping] entails, no criteria for when operations are to be established, and no guidelines for how to plan and deploy them.”⁶ According to this apt characterization, PKOs can be defined as a “political mechanism that uses military means to create the conditions that will facilitate parties to settle their differences” or alternatively as “a military instrument that pursues military objectives and solutions using its physical authority.”⁷ In any case, either under the authorization of the UN or international or regional organizations, PKOs are established to prevent a breach of the peace and/or the maintenance and restoration thereof as stipulated under Chapter VII of the UNCh.⁸ Since the notion of a permanent international military force pursuant to Art. 43

6 J.-M. Guéhenno, ‘On the Challenges and Achievements of Reforming UN Peace Operations’, 9 *International Peacekeeping* (2002) 2, 69, 69.

7 N. Tsagourias, ‘Consent, Neutrality/Impartiality and the Use of Force in Peacekeeping: Their Constitutional Dimensions’, 11 *Journal of Conflict & Security Law* (2006) 3, 465, 468.

8 P. Labuda, ‘Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement’, *Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law* (2015), para. 1 [Labuda, ‘Peacekeeping’].

UNCh has never become operational,⁹ the UN was tasked with identifying other means to achieve the objectives of Art. 1(1) UNCh.¹⁰ The establishment of PKOs, in which context State troops are made available to the UN on an *ad hoc* basis and, as such, are subjected to UN command, constituted one such initiative.¹¹

The impetus for the conception of the term peacekeeping stemmed from the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the prevailing circumstances of the Cold War era, which had a deleterious effect on the functionality of the UNSC, thus compelling the UNGA to promulgate the seminal *Uniting for Peace Resolution*¹². With this Resolution, the UNGA did not ascribe itself the powers inherent in Chapter VII; it rather asserted that, in the event that the UNSC was unable to act in the interests of maintaining international peace and security, the UNGA would assume responsibility for addressing these issues.¹³ The adoption of the Resolution culminated in the establishment of the UN Emergency Force in the Suez (UNEF I), which was followed in 1960 by the UNSC's adoption of Resolution 143 (1960)¹⁴, thereby establishing its inaugural PKO, the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC).¹⁵

Considering that PKOs constituted a response to the politically restrictive effects of the Cold War, the absence of any regulatory framework or explicit mention of peacekeeping in the UNCh is unsurprising. Within the *Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion*, the ICJ stipulated that the fundamental principles of peacekeeping are predicated upon the criteria of consent, impartiality, and the use of

9 Art. 43(1) UNCh states, 'All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.'

10 Labuda, 'Peacekeeping', *supra* note 8, para. 7; E. de Wet, 'Article 42', in B. Simma *et al.* (eds), *The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary*, Vol. II, 4th ed. (2024), 1691, 1692, para. 3 [De Wet, 'Art. 42'].

11 De Wet, 'Art. 42', *supra* note 10, 1693, para. 4.

12 GA Res. 377 (V), UN Doc. A/RES/377(V), 3 November 1950.

13 C. Tomuschat, 'Uniting for Peace' (2008), available at https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ufp/ufp_e.pdf, 1-2 (last visited 23 February 2025).

14 SC Res. 143, UN Doc. S/RES/143, 14 July 1960.

15 E. de Wet, *The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council* (2004), 31 [De Wet, *Chapter VII*].

force only in instances of self-defense.¹⁶ The principle of *consent* pertains to the necessity of the host State's consent for the execution of operations within its territory to avoid the contravention of Art. 2(7) UNCh¹⁷. The criteria of *impartiality* and *minimum use of force* mandate that the military forces maintain an impartial stance towards the parties involved in the hostilities and that force may be exercised exclusively in the context of self-defense. Based on a confluence of political, normative, and security considerations did the principles and especially the permissible use of force evolve over time, which will be discussed in the following section.¹⁸

The prevailing criteria designate that PKOs would be classified as measures under Chapter VI of the UNCh. Irrespective of these non-coercive measures, the UNSC is authorized to implement more coercive mandates for PKOs under Chapter VII. Based on this conceptual positioning, as a legal fiction PKOs have been referred to as Chapter VI ½ measures.¹⁹ Since the first PKOs were established by both the UNGA and the UNSC, the question emerged as to which body should be entrusted with the function. Within its *Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion*, the ICJ determined that although the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security rests with the UNSC due to its capability of authorizing coercive action,²⁰ it simultaneously asserted that Art. 14 UNCh²¹ – with the restrictions imposed by Art. 12(1) and Art. 11(2) UNCh²² – endows the

16 *Ibid.*, 33.

17 Art. 2(7) UNCh states, 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.'

18 J. A. Koops *et al.*, 'Introduction: The United Nations and Peacekeeping', in J. A. Koops *et al.* (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (2015), 1, 2; A. Duursma *et al.*, 'UN Peacekeeping at 75: Achievements, Challenges, and Prospects', 30 *International Peacekeeping* (2023) 4, 415, 419.

19 N. D. White, 'Peacekeeping and International Law' in J. A. Koops *et al.* (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (2015), 43, 44 [White, 'Peacekeeping and International Law']; J. Sloan, 'The Evolution of the Use of Force in UN Peacekeeping', 37 *Journal of Strategic Studies* (2014) 5, 674, 679; K. Cox, 'Beyond Self-Defense: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations & (and) the Use of Force', 27 *Denver Journal of International Law & Policy* (1999) 2, 239, 249.

UNGA with the authority to propose specific measures for peaceful adjustment. This legal assessment has however largely become obsolete since the UNGA has thus far only established two PKOs (UNEF I and the UN Security Force in West New Guinea in 1962) and has remained inactive in recent decades.²³

C. Using Force in Peacekeeping Missions

The absolute prohibition of the threat or use of force pursuant to Art. 2(4) UNCh²⁴ is subject to three exceptions enumerated in the UNCh itself: self-defense pursuant to Art. 51 UNCh²⁵, authorized force pursuant to Chapter VII

20 White, 'Peacekeeping and International Law', *supra* note 19, 45; *Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Art. 17, para. 2, of the Charter)*, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1962, available at <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/49> (last visited 2 November 2025).

21 Art. 14 UNCh states, 'Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.'

22 Art. 12 (1) UNCh states, 'While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests.' Art. 11(2) UNCh further stipulates that in instances where *action* is required, the UNSC must be consulted. The ICJ however clarified that this exclusive competence of the UNSC only applies in instances in which enforcement action is required. Cf. *Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Art. 17, para. 2, of the Charter)*, *supra* note 20.

23 De Wet, *Chapter VII*, *supra* note 15, 32-33; Labuda, 'Peacekeeping', *supra* note 8, para. 16.

24 Art. 2(4) UNCh states, 'All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.'

25 Art. 51 UNCh states, 'Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.'

and force against enemy States pursuant to Art. 107 UNCh^{26,27}. As articulated above, a fundamental criterion of traditional PKOs is the non-use of force, which is in alignment with the referred prohibition. The ICJ however acknowledged that PKOs may resort to the use of force in instances of self-defense, the scope of which is to be “normally interpreted narrowly to cover a peacekeeper using force in defense of his own life”²⁸, and thus stipulated that the concept encompasses an exception to the prohibition of the use of force.²⁹

The scope of the permissible use of force has, however, already been interpreted differently with regard to the initial UN PKOs. While UNEF I adhered to a narrow interpretation, the troops involved in ONUC were equipped with a wide variety of weaponry. Despite the fact that the use of force was permitted only defensively (i.e., in instances of self-defense) by ONUC’s mandate, evidence emerged in 1961 indicating a more proactive approach and the enforcement of peace.³⁰ As UN Secretary-General (UNSG) Thant articulated in 1964 with regard to the mandate of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), self-defense should be understood to “include the United Nations posts, premises and vehicles under armed attack, as well as the support of other personnel of UNFICYP under armed attack.”³¹ In 1973, as part of the mandate of UNEF II, the concept of

26 Art. 107 UNCh stipulates, ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.’

Regarding the legal relevance of Art. 107 UNCh it has to be mentioned that its legal significance was linked to the situation after World War II. With the settlement of the implications of World War II the provision became irrelevant and obsolete. Cf. I. Couzigou, ‘Article 107’, in B. Simma *et al.* (eds), *The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary*, Vol. I, 4th ed. (2024), 2829, 2851, para. 33.

27 C. Tams, ‘Article 2 (4)’, in B. Simma *et al.* (eds), *The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary*, Vol. I, 4th ed. (2024), 289, 348-349, paras 116-118.

28 White, ‘Peacekeeping and International Law’, *supra* note 19, 51.

29 Cf. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Art. 17, para. 2, of the Charter), *supra* note 20; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, 18 January 2008, 31.

30 White, ‘Peacekeeping and International Law’, *supra* note 19, 51.

31 UNSC, *Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus*, UN Doc. S/5950, 10 September 1964, 4, para. 7 (c).

self-defense was reapplied, as peacekeepers were permitted to use force in instances of a threat to one's life and the mandate.³² As subsequently stipulated by the UN in 1995, the notion of self-defense shall further be interpreted to encompass instances where the protection of "comrades and any person entrusted in one's care, as well as defending one's post, convey, vehicle, or rifle"³³ is deemed imperative. Pursuant to this perspective, the UN Secretariat has taken the stance that all PKOs inherently permit the use of force in defense of the mandate.³⁴

As PKOs were initially intended to proceed without the use of coercive measures and with consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force, the question of whether authorization pursuant to Chapter VII was required did not arise as not a single PKO was adopted under Chapter VII during the Cold War.³⁵ With the commencement of the 1990s, the political structure changed and so did PKOs. Since then, PKOs have not only been adopted under Chapter VII but further have been authorized to use force not merely in instances of self-defense but to achieve various other objectives, such as providing humanitarian assistance or the protection of the civilian population.³⁶ These differ from operations in which Chapter VII was invoked due to emergency situations,³⁷ insofar as these operations have been adopted under the Chapter from the outset. Within these mandates, the UNSC however did not specify that the use of force was merely permissible in self-defense.³⁸

Notwithstanding these legal adjustments regarding the permissibility of the use of force in PKOs, there have been other proposals based primarily on political considerations for the further development of PKOs. In this regard, the Brahimi Report of 21 August 2009³⁹, within which the UNSG presented his position on PKOs, is worth mentioning. Although the Report emphasized that the use of force in self-defense constitutes one of the "bedrock principles of peacekeeping",

32 Sloan, *supra* note 19, 684; Cox, *supra* note 19, 253-255; P. Labuda, 'UN Peacekeeping as Intervention by Invitation. Host State Consent and the Use of Force in Security-Council-Mandated Stabilization Operations', 7 *Journal of the Use of Force and International Law* (2020) 2, 317, 319 [Labuda, 'Intervention by Invitation'].

33 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations*, UN/210/TC/GG95, October 1995, 20, para. 34.

34 *Ibid.*

35 De Wet, 'Art. 42', *supra* note 10, 1693, para. 5; Sloan, *supra* note 19, 682.

36 De Wet, 'Art. 42', *supra* note 10, 1693, para. 6.

it further proposed that peacekeepers are “capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate, with robust rules of engagement [...]”⁴⁰. The Report, in addition, advocated for rules of engagement (ROEs) that ensure UN forces do not relinquish the initiative to their attackers, thus suggesting that peacekeepers should be permitted to use not only *defensive* force, but further *offensive* and hence *proactive* force.⁴¹ Absent from the UNSG’s remarks was any specification to what extent force should be authorized.⁴²

37 Examples of this include the United Nations Protection Force in former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) as well as the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). Following the establishment of UNPROFOR in 1992, and given that its mandate permitted the use of force solely in instances of self-defense and defense of the mandate, the UNSC, operating explicitly under Chapter VII of the UNCh, adopted Resolution 836 (1993) in 1993, which authorized UNPROFOR “to take the necessary measures, including the use of force in reply to bombardments against the safe areas”. The UNSC however similarly stipulated that the use of force under Chapter VII was permissible exclusively in circumstances of self-defense. Cf. SC Res. 743, UN Doc. S/RES/743, 21 February 1992; SC Res. 836, UN Doc. S/RES/836, 4 June 1993.

The UNOSOM mandate underwent a comparable evolution. Initially established as a non-forceful operation in 1992, the UNSC acting under Chapter VII of the UNCh authorized the peacekeepers the following year to use “such forceful action as may be required to neutralize armed elements that attack or threaten to attack”. Following the deaths of 26 peacekeepers in 1993, the mandate of UNOSOM II was extended to allow “all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks”. Cf. SC Res. 751, UN Doc. S/RES/751, 24 April 1992; SC Res. 814, UN Doc. S/RES/814, 26 March 1993; SC Res. 837, UN Doc. S/RES/837, 6 June 1993.

38 Sloan, *supra* note 19, 692. Prominent examples of such PKOs are the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Cf. SC Res. 1270, UN Doc. S/RES/1270, 22 October 1999; SC Res. 1509, UN Doc. S/RES/1509, 19 September 2003; SC Res. 1542, UN Doc. S/RES/1542, 30 April 2004.

39 United Nations General Assembly & Security Council, *Identical Letters Dated 21 August From the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council*, UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.

40 *Ibid.*, 10, para. 55.

41 *Ibid.*, 9, para. 49; Sloan, *supra* note 19, 691.

42 C. Gray, *International Law and the Use of Force*, 4th ed. (2018), 322.

In addition, the UN promulgated guidelines for the use of force in the context of PKOs, the Capstone Doctrine⁴³, in 2008. With regard to the notion of *proactive* use of force, the Doctrine emphasized that “military units must be proactive to deter/disrupt hostile intent or act before the situation becomes critical.”⁴⁴ It is further imperative for peacekeepers to respond “proactively and robustly with the appropriate level of force (i.e., ‘just enough’).”⁴⁵ In operationalizing this, the ROEs should enable peacekeepers to “not wait for hostile elements to attack civilians or United Nations personnel before using the appropriate level of force to prevent violence.”⁴⁶ This *proactive* and *robust* approach, is intended not only to safeguard the civilian population but further to enhance the credibility of the peacekeepers.

Finally, there is the necessity to address the repeatedly expressed demand for more *robustness* of PKO mandates. The adoption of UNSC Resolutions under Chapter VII, or the utilization of the phrase *all necessary means*, are often considered as the basis for the robustness of mandates⁴⁷, and the academic discourse concluded that the two should be considered equivalent.⁴⁸ Regarding mandates that are implemented under Chapter VII, this classification emerges as relatively uncontroversial. While the UNSC does not explicitly delineate the legal foundation within Chapter VII for the adoption of these mandates,⁴⁹ the *robustness* of them can be substantiated by the powers accorded to the UNSC under the Chapter as such.⁵⁰ It is, however, crucial to note that UNSC Resolutions, even when adopted pursuant to Chapter VII, do not inherently constitute authorizations

43 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations & Department of Field Support, *Guidelines: Use of Force by Military Components in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, UN Doc. 2016.24, 1 February 2007, available at <https://info.publicintelligence.net/UN-PeacekeepingForces-2017.pdf> (last visited 2 November 2025).

44 *Ibid.*, 12, para. 31.

45 *Ibid.*

46 *Ibid.*

47 Labuda, ‘Intervention by Invitation’, *supra* note 32, 328.

48 *Ibid.*

49 While Arts 39, 40 and 41 UNCh stipulate the utilization of non-forcible measures, Art. 42 UNCh conversely pertains to forcible measures and, by implication, the employment of military force.

50 Labuda, ‘Intervention by Invitation’, *supra* note 32, 332-333.

for *offensive* use of force.⁵¹ It has conversely been demonstrated that PKOs exist, which have not been established pursuant to Chapter VII, yet have been authorized to use force that extends beyond instances of self-defense. One such PKO is UNIFIL. It can thus be inferred that *robust* mandates do not invariably have to be concluded under Chapter VII.⁵²

Notwithstanding these considerations, it is notable that certain mandates incorporate the phrase *all necessary means*, which is particularly problematic in instances where the UNSC establishes a PKO outside of Chapter VII. This is primarily due to the ambiguity surrounding the scope of permissible force, specifically whether lethal force is encompassed.⁵³ Murphy criticizes this phrase, labelling it as “a typical UN euphemism for the use of force” and further notes, that “it is still not clear what it means in practice.”⁵⁴

Since the emphasis on a more proactive utilization of force can be detected in both the Brahimi Report and the Capstone Doctrine, a further discernible shift is evidenced. This suggests an alteration from the predominantly *defensive* to an *offensive* use of force, particularly if one considers the inherently defensive nature of PKOs.⁵⁵ This transition is exemplified by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO). The UNSC Resolution 2502 (2019) led to the establishment of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB)⁵⁶, which is authorized to “carry out targeted offensive operations in the DRC [Democratic Republic of Congo] to neutralize armed groups”⁵⁷.

51 N. White, ‘Peacekeeping or War-Fighting?’, in N. D. White and C. Henderson (eds.), *Research Handbook on International Conflict and Security Law: Jus Ad Bellum, Jus in Bello and Jus Post Bellum* (2013), 572, 584-585. This can be evidenced by the PKOs in Liberia (UNMIL) and Haiti (MINUSTAH), which, although adopted under Chapter VII, did not receive the authorization for offensive use of force. Cf. SC Res. 1509, UN Doc. S/RES/1509, 19 September 2003, 3, para. 3 (j); SC Res. 1542, UN Doc. S/RES/1542, 30 April 2004, 3, para. 7 I (e) and (f).

52 Labuda, ‘Intervention by Invitation’, *supra* note 32, 333-335.

53 *Ibid.*, 328.

54 R. Murphy, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia, and the Use of Force’ 8 *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* (2003) 1, 1, 75.

55 Labuda, ‘Intervention by Invitation’, *supra* note 32, 322.

56 The brigade comprises three infantry battalions, as well as an artillery. They are supported by a reconnaissance company, which is under direct command of the Force Commander. Cf. Sloan, *supra* note 19, 695.

As has been demonstrated, PKOs have evolved since their initiation and not exclusively in terms of the permissible scope of the use of force. Following these general remarks, the ensuing discussion will proceed to an examination of the mandate of UNIFIL.

D. Establishing UNIFIL I – Evolving Into UNIFIL II

In accordance with UNSC Resolutions 425 and 426 (1978), UNIFIL was established on 19 March 1978 in the southern part of Lebanon. This was, however, not the first deployment of UN military forces to the region. Prior to UNIFIL, the UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)⁵⁸ had been established in 1958 by the UNSC pursuant to Chapter VI, which was entrusted with the responsibility of border control.⁵⁹

In 1978, Lebanon submitted a formal complaint to the UNSC, citing the since the 1970s continuously heightening tensions in the southern region of the State, particularly the areas in close proximity to the border with Israel. Lebanon had been further embroiled in a civil war between its ethnic and religious groups since 1976, a situation becoming increasingly complex due to the participation of Palestinian militants arriving from Jordan.⁶⁰ Following the attacks on Israel

57 SC Res. 2502, UN Doc. S/RES/2502, 19 December 2019, 9, para. 29 (i) (e).

58 UNOGIL constituted a seven-month observation mission established by the UNSC in 1958 after the submission of a complaint by Lebanon. Within its complaint, Lebanon alleged the interference of the United Arab Republic in its internal affairs, which was based on the assumption that the United Arab Republic supported the infiltration of Syrian troops into Lebanon. Cf. G. Mesquita & N. White, 'United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)', in J. Koops *et al.* (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (2015), 248, 248.

59 J. Theodorides, 'The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon', 20 *The Military Law and the Law of War Review* (1981) 3-4, 309, 311. Even before that the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established to maintain the peace between Israel and Syria, which was tasked by the UNSC with Resolution 50 (1948) to supervise the implementation of the truce with the assistance of a group of military observers. These observers are today inter alia attached to UNIFIL. Cf. SC Res. 50, UN Doc. S/RES/50, 29 May 1948; United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, 'Background' (2025), available at <https://untso.unmissions.org/background> (last visited 7 October 2025).

under the direction of Palestinian forces, Israel retaliated against these elements in Lebanon, leading to the occupation of the entire southern part of Lebanon except for the city of Tyre. Based on these events, Lebanon sought intervention from the UN.⁶¹

Prior to the deployment of UN troops, Israel had already declared a cease-fire in March 1978, which nonetheless resulted in the continuing occupation of the regions in southern Lebanon.⁶² As a consequence of the mounting political and military challenges in At-Tiri, the UNSC was already compelled to adopt Resolution 467 (1980)⁶³, in which the existing mandate of UNIFIL was endorsed and the permissible extent of force explicitly addressed.⁶⁴

With the exception of the Shebaa Farms and the Kfar Shouba Hills, the withdrawal of the IDF from southern Lebanon was documented in 2000.⁶⁵ As a result, the remaining objective of UNIFIL was to re-establish Lebanese effective control, the completion of which proved to be unfeasible due to the presence of Hezbollah in the region.⁶⁶ Subsequent to Israel's withdrawal, the situation again deteriorated with the invasion of Israel by Hezbollah and Israel's subsequent military response in July 2006. During these military confrontations, both Israel and Hezbollah targeted objects within and beyond the Blue Line⁶⁷. In response to the resumption of hostilities, the UNSC initiated negotiations concerning the mandate of UNIFIL. These ultimately led to the adoption of Resolution 1701 (2006). With a significant expansion of the *robustness* of the mandate (see below),

60 Newby, *supra* note 2, 59.

61 A. Novosseloff, 'United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL I)', in J. Koops *et al.* (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (2015), 248, 248; S. Wills, *Protecting Civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers* (2009), 14.

62 Newby, *supra* note 2, 60.

63 SC Res. 467, UN Doc. S/RES/467, 24 April 1980.

64 Murphy, *supra* note 54, 86.

65 Newby, *supra* note 2, 64; Cf. Williamson, *supra* note 5, 284.

66 A. Novosseloff, 'Expanded United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL II)', in J. Koops *et al.* (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (2015), 767, 767 [Novosseloff, 'UNIFIL II'].

67 The Blue Line represents a *line of withdrawal* established by UNIFIL, rather than a border in the sense of international law between Lebanon and Israel.

a substantial augmentation of peacekeepers to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and a notable increase in European participation, the Resolution effectively transformed UNIFIL I into UNIFIL II.⁶⁸

Despite the endorsement of the amended mandate by both Lebanon and Israel, its effective implementation was met with some resistance from Israel and Hezbollah, thereby subjecting its *robustness* to scrutiny. While Israel proceeded to undertake overflights with jets and unmanned aerial vehicles, Hezbollah relied on the civilian population to impede the peacekeepers from conducting searches of their weapon depots. Notwithstanding the attendant difficulties, the situation stabilized.⁶⁹ In February 2013, the then UNSG reported an “unprecedented calm that has continued to prevail across the Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel since 2006”⁷⁰. However, this period of relative tranquility was subject to several intermittent flare-ups in 2015, which did not result in a lasting escalation.⁷¹ In the context of this annual renewal of the mandate, the UNSC adopted Resolutions 2372 (2017)⁷², 2433 (2018),⁷³ and 2485 (2019)⁷⁴, which primarily addressed the establishment and the subsequent transfer of responsibilities regarding the Maritime Task Force and the land areas in southern Lebanon from the UN troops to the Lebanese military.

Despite the occurrence of repeated incidents within the Blue Line in the following years, which did result in the death of peacekeepers,⁷⁵ the gradual escalation of the situation since October 2024 attracted significant attention to the mandate of UNIFIL. UNIFIL initially issued warnings that the hostilities were approaching the mandate area.⁷⁶ Shortly afterwards, reports of injured peace-

68 Novosseloff, ‘UNIFIL II’, *supra* note 66, 768, 771; Newby, *supra* note 2, 65, 69-70; Wills, *supra* note 67, 16; C. Tams & W. Brückner, ‘The Israeli Intervention in Lebanon – 2006’, in T. Ruys & O. Corten (eds), *The Use of Force in International Law: A Case-based Approach* (2018), 673, 673.

69 Novosseloff, ‘UNIFIL II’, *supra* note 66, 772; For a more detailed analyses of the situation since 2006 see Newby, *supra* note 2, 73-81.

70 United Nations Security Council, *Report by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)*, UN Doc. S/2013/120, 27 February 2013, para. 75.

71 Newby, *supra* note 2, 79.

72 SC Res. 2373, UN Doc. S/RES/2373, 30 August 2017.

73 SC Res. 2433, UN Doc. S/RES/2433, 30 August 2018.

74 SC Res. 2485, UN Doc. S/RES/2485, 29 August 2019.

keepers and damages to the premises of UNIFIL emerged.⁷⁷ Notwithstanding the exhortations from UNIFIL and the UN,⁷⁸ an agreement on the cessation of hostilities between Israel and Lebanon was adopted in November 2024, which stipulated the withdrawal of the IDF and those attributable to Hezbollah from southern Lebanon within 60 days and to concurrently guarantee that UNIFIL's mandate is no longer contravened and can henceforth be fully implemented.⁷⁹ Despite the withdrawal of the IDF from the coastal regions, their presence persists in selected areas at the borders, thereby postponing the full implementation of the agreement.⁸⁰ This current non-implementation of the ceasefire agreement, coupled with the preceding events serve to illustrate⁸¹ that peace remains elusive in southern Lebanon. Although the UNSC acknowledges that the situation in southern Lebanon still presents itself as a threat to international peace and security, it decided to prolong the mandate for one more year and simultaneously stipulated that the PKO will cease its operations and begin its drawdown and withdrawal phase by 31 December 2026.⁸²

75 Cf. T. Bel, 'UN Car Hit by Deadly Gunfire Likely Strayed off Main Road in Lebanon's Blackouts', *Independent* (16 December 2022), available at <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/unifil-lebanon-irish-soldier-dead-b2246611.html> (last visited 14 December 2024).

76 UNIFIL, 'UNIFIL Statement (6 October 2024)' (2024), available at <https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-6-october-2024> (last visited 14 December 2024).

77 UNIFIL, 'UNIFIL Statement (10 October 2024)' (2024), available at <https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-10-october> (last visited 14 December 2024); UNIFIL, 'UNIFIL Statement (11 October 2024)' (2024), available at <https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-11-october-2024-0> (last visited 14 December 2024); UNIFIL, 'UNIFIL Statement (19 November 2024)' (2024), available at <https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-19-november-2024> (last visited 15 December 2024); UNIFIL, 'UNIFIL Statement: Rockets Strike UNIFIL Sector West Headquarters, Injuring 4 Peacekeepers (22 November 2024)' (2024), available at <https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-rockets-strike-unifil-sector-west-headquarters-injuring-4-peacekeepers-22-november> (last visited 15 December 2024).

78 United Nations, 'Lebanon: UNIFIL Concerned by Attacks on Lebanese Armed Forces', *UN News Global perspective Human Stories* (25 November 2024), available at <https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/11/1157456> (last visited 2 January 2025).

79 F. Gardner & F. Mao, 'Israel-Hezbollah Ceasefire Deal Agreed, Confirms Biden', *BBC* (27 November 2024), available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c75lpzq0re1o> (last visited 28 November 2024).

E. Categorizing UNIFIL Within UN Peacekeeping Operations

As previously mentioned, UNIFIL was established in March 1978 on the basis of UNSC Resolutions 425 and 426 (1978), which called on Israel to bring an end to its ongoing military operations and to withdraw its armed forces. UNIFIL was simultaneously assigned three primary objectives: to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli military forces, to restore international peace and security, and to support the Lebanese government with the facilitation of its re-establishment of effective control in the region.⁸³ Since the UNSC did not adopt them under Chap-

- 80 A. Cheeseman, 'Lebanon Says Israeli Troops Killed 24 Ahead of Ceasefire Extension', *The Washington Post* (27 January 2025), available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/01/26/lebanon-ceasefire-israel-hezbollah/> (last visited 27 January 2025); H. Bachega, 'Lebanon Says 22 Killed by Israeli Forces After Withdrawal Deadline Missed', *BBC* (26 January 2025), available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/czepnrw4repo> (last visited 27 January 2025); E. Ward, 'As Deadline for Withdrawal Passes, Israel Remains in Parts of Southern Lebanon', *The New York Times* (18 February 2025), available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/18/world/middleeast/lebanon-israel-forces-hezbollah.html> (last visited 22 February 2025).
- 81 UNIFIL, 'UNIFIL Statement (4 January 2025)' (2025), available at <https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-4-january-2025> (last visited 8 October 2025); UNIFIL, 'UNIFIL Statement (14 February 2025)' (2025), available at <https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-14-february-2025> (last visited 8 October 2025); UNIFIL, 'UNIFIL Statement (22 March 2025)' (2025), available at <https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-22-march-2025> (last visited 8 October 2025); UNIFIL, 'UNIFIL Statement (14 May 2025)' (2025), available at <https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-14-may-2025> (last visited 8 October 2025); UNIFIL, 'UNIFIL Statement (10 June 2025)' (2025), available at <https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-10-june-2025> (last visited 8 October 2025); UNIFIL, 'UNIFIL Statement on Attack on Peacekeepers Clearing Roadblocks (3 September 2025)' (2025), available at <https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-attack-peacekeepers-clearing-roadblocks-3-september-2025> (last visited 8 October 2025); UNIFIL, 'UNIFIL Statement on Recent IDF Grenade Attacks Near Peacekeepers and Lebanese Soldiers (3 October 2025)' (2025), available at <https://unifil.unmissions.org/unifil-statement-recent-idf-grenade-attacks-near-peacekeepers-and-lebanese-soldiers-3-october-2025> (last visited 8 October 2025).
- 82 SC Res. 2790, UN Doc. S/RES/2790, 28 August 2025.

ter VII and the PKO was further established with the consent of both Lebanon and Israel, UNIFIL I may be regarded as a, the traditional criteria upholding, PKO. Notwithstanding the absence of explicit reference to the use of force in the UNIFIL establishing resolutions, the subsequent report by the then UNSG shed light on the implementation of them. Specifically, the report stated that, although UNIFIL would be equipped with weapons, for the PKO to be effective, they however may solely be utilized for defensive purposes – entailing instances of self-defense. A further category of instances was identified to authorize using force: those in which “attempts by forceful means [which] prevent [UNIFIL] from discharging its duties under the mandate of the UNSC”⁸⁴. The UNSC deliberated upon the scope of the permissible use of force and the exercise of self-defense in the context of Resolution 467 (1980). In doing so, it explicitly stated that UNIFIL is authorized to use force in instances of self-defense,⁸⁵ and further elaborated that the term *self-defense* also encompasses the “resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council”⁸⁶. On the matter, the then UNSG elucidated that “[t]he force will be provided with weapons of a defensive character. It shall not use force except in self-defense. Self-defense would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council.”⁸⁷ These elaborations demonstrate that UNIFIL I was in accordance with the prevailing concept of PKOs during that period, which stipulated that use of force is permissible in instances of self-defense, including personal self-defense as well as defense of the mandate. Nevertheless, with respect to its original mandate the extension to include instances of self-defense in defending the mandate constitutes a new component.

83 SC Res. 425, *supra* note 3, 5; Cf. UNSC, *The Situation in the Middle East*, UN Doc. S/PV.2074, 19 March 1978; UNSC, *The Situation in the Middle East*, UN Doc. S/PV.2075, 19 March 1978.

84 UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 425 (1978)*, UN Doc. S/12611, 19 March 1978, 2 [UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General*].

85 UNSC, *The Situation in the Middle East*, UN Doc. S/PV.2218, 24 April 1980, 6, para. 57; Cf. Gray, *supra* note 42, 321; Murphy, *supra* note 54, 86-87.

86 SC Res. 467, *supra* note 63, 7, para. 1.

87 UNSC, *Report of the Secretary-General*, *supra* note 84, 2.

As previously outlined, the situation in southern Lebanon deteriorated in 2006, resulting in renewed widespread hostilities in the region. In light of these developments, the then UNSG asserted during the negotiations on Resolution 1701 (2006), with regard to the implementation of the objectives of UNIFIL I, that the PKO was tasked with addressing a situation “for which it was neither mandated nor equipped”⁸⁸. He further emphasized that UNIFIL is faced with “a new task, perhaps, even more difficult and dangerous than its previous one”, which requires it and the mandate to be “robust and effective”⁸⁹. The representatives of France and Qatar underscored the notion that the primary objective of UNIFIL should not be the imposition of peace, but rather the implementation of its mandate in accordance with Chapter VI.⁹⁰ Israel conversely advocated for the deployment of a mere observation mission, whereas Lebanon was unequivocal in its opposition to the mention of Chapter VII, arguing that UNIFIL would be granted peace enforcement powers.⁹¹ The outcome of these deliberations was Resolution 1701 (2006), which effectively replaced UNIFIL I with UNIFIL II. With respect to the permissible use of force, UNIFIL II was authorized “to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities”, in order to ensure the protection of the mandate, as well as UN “personnel, facilities, installations and equipment”⁹² and the civilian population.

In consideration of Resolution 1701 (2006), it is first imperative to acknowledge that the UNSC essentially validated the prevailing practices regarding PKOs. UNIFIL II was accorded the prerogative to employ force in instances of self-defense, encompassing both individual and in defense of the mandate, and was further entrusted with the responsibility of safeguarding the civilian population. With regard to the permissive extent of the use of force, UNIFIL II was authorized “to take all necessary action”⁹³, nevertheless the UNSC refrained from explicitly acting under Chapter VII.⁹⁴ In accordance with the perspective that

88 UNSC, *The Situation in the Middle East*, UN Doc. S/PV.5511, 11 August 2006, 3.

89 *Ibid.*, 3.

90 *Ibid.*, 4-5.

91 Novosseloff, ‘UNIFIL II’, *supra* note 66, 769-770.

92 SC Res. 1701, UN Doc. S/RES/1701, 11 August 2006, 3-4, para. 12.

93 *Ibid.*

94 Labuda, ‘Intervention by Invitation’, *supra* note 32, 16.

interprets references to Chapter VII or the phrase *all necessary means* as indicators of *robust* mandates, it may be inferred that the mandate of UNIFIL II can be characterized as a *robust* PKO. In the absence of any reference to Chapter VII, the extent to which force may be employed remains ambiguous. Given that UNIFIL operates outside the purview of Chapter VII, it follows that its permissive scope of the use of force is inherently constrained to instances deemed as personal self-defense or defense of the mandate. It is further noteworthy that the Resolution does not authorize *proactive* use of force. As Labuda emphasizes with respect to UNIFIL, the establishment thereof was predicated on a request by the government of Lebanon, which makes the authorization to employ force contingent upon the consent of the host State. As such, a *robust* mandate has been established for UNIFIL and it is further empowered to employ force for the protection of civilians.⁹⁵

In conclusion, it can be posited that, whilst UNIFIL arguably possesses a *robust* mandate due to the use of the phrase *all necessary means*, the PKO has not been authorized to undertake action pursuant to Chapter VII or to use force *proactively*.

F. UNIFIL: Once More at a Critical Juncture?

UNIFIL constitutes a PKO, whose mandate has not explicitly been adopted under Chapter VII. This suggests that, if the mandate were to be adopted pursuant to Chapter VII, it would provide a more definitive clarification regarding the use of force, including its potential to extend beyond self-defense. Although the phrase *to take all necessary means* does authorize UNIFIL to employ force *robustly*, this is predicated on the assumption that it can be equated with a resolution adopted pursuant to Chapter VII with respect to the permissible use of force. Khalil concurs, asserting that PKOs need “to proactively engage in preventive action against hostile parties; in short, to become actual and active players in the operating environments in which they are deployed.”⁹⁶ With regard to

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁹⁶ M. Khalil, ‘Robust Peacekeeping – Not Aggressive Peacekeeping’, 112 *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)* (2018), 114, 115.

UNIFIL, the adoption of its mandate in accordance with Chapter VII would ensure its definitive categorization as a *robust* PKO and would authorize the deployment of more extensive and possibly even *offensive* use of force.

It is, however, crucial to recognize that, in addition to the principles of minimum use of force and consent, a PKO is required to meet the criterion of impartiality. The authorization of a PKO not only to employ force but further to take a *proactive* approach would effectively render it a party to the conflict, and this would consequently undermine its perceived neutrality.⁹⁷ Cox has acknowledged that, “it is obvious that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the UN to engage in coercive force and still be regarded as a neutral body.”⁹⁸ As Khalil further observed, the UN Secretariat has previously acknowledged that UN troops have become a party to an armed conflict in the DRC (MONUSCO).⁹⁹ Drawing upon these preceding experiences, it can be deduced that the extension of UNIFIL’s mandate would inevitably result in UN troops ceasing to function as a neutral authority and they would assume the role of a party to the conflict.

The proactive use of force against various militarily active groups within the framework of PKOs, which ultimately follows the objectives to preserve international peace and security in accordance with their mandate, bears resemblance to the use of force within the context of peace enforcement operations pursuant to Chapter VII. By employing force in a proactive manner, PKOs undertake tasks, which would typically be regarded as activities pursuant to peace enforcement operations. The extension of the permissible use of force thus serves to align the two forms of peace missions within the UN system.¹⁰⁰ Similarly, Khalil argues that the UNSC “must preserve the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement”¹⁰¹. In accordance, the maintenance of the present mandate for UNIFIL would serve to prevent the gradual progression of PKOs towards peace enforcement.

97 S. W. Lyons, ‘New Robust Peacekeeping’ 112 *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)* (2018) 109, 110.

98 Cox, *supra* note 19, 246.

99 Khalil, *supra* note 96, 116.

100 Labuda, ‘Intervention by Invitation’, *supra* note 32, 344.

101 Khalil, *supra* note 96, 117.

Another salient point for consideration is the political and factual situation in southern Lebanon: Commencing with the establishment of the mandate in 1978, UNIFIL has been confronted with a state of conflict in the region, which evolved over time into a multifaceted confrontation involving a diverse set of actors. UNIFIL does face these challenges and furthermore was and is confronted with another threat for the successful implementation of the mandate in 2024. Despite the evident parallels between the circumstances of 2006 and 2024, and the fact that the ceasefire agreement of November 2024 is yet to be fully implemented, it is crucial to recognize the intricacies of the present situation. In consideration of the prevailing instability, it would be imprudent to further empower UNIFIL with an even more *robust* mandate as this may only serve to exacerbate existing circumstances.

Lastly it should be borne in mind that, while Lebanon initially endorsed the deployment of substantial military forces upon the adoption of Resolution 1701 (2006), it objected to the mention of Chapter VII. The prospect of an augmented use of force in southern Lebanon (even in the event that Lebanon has changed its view) carries the potential to engender an even larger number of intractable disputes rather than fostering resolution.

G. Conclusion

It is evident that PKOs of the UN have evolved significantly since the introduction of the term and the establishment of UNEF I by the UNGA. This progression is attributable to both political and factual changes. Whereas PKOs were initially authorized to employ force in personal self-defense, this prerogative has been progressively broadened over time, culminating in the defense-of-mandate utilization of force. PKOs have furthermore been assigned an expanded array of responsibilities that include the protection of civilians, a development that has concomitantly given rise to an augmentation in the permissible scope of the use of force. Lastly, there have been ongoing deliberations concerning the enhancement of the robustness of PKOs, with the underlying question of whether PKOs, by virtue of their inherent *defensive* nature should engage in hostilities by employing *proactive* use of force.

These recent developments in the realm of PKOs, coupled with the stipulation of minimal use of force, are further evident in the mandate of UNIFIL. UNIFIL is presently afforded the authority to employ *all necessary means*, but the mandate was not adopted pursuant to Chapter VII. In light of the recent developments in southern Lebanon, it has been argued here that UNIFIL is likelier to achieve the objectives of its mandate, if it continues its neutral stance in the region, operates without the authorization pursuant to Chapter VII, and abstains from *proactive* military intervention. The UN and the UNSC in particular should give particular consideration to the underlying concept and the principles of peacekeeping when contemplating the expansion of the permissible use of force in the context of PKOs in general. With respect to UNIFIL, the UNSC has already endorsed this course by extending UNIFIL's current mandate for another year and confirming the current scope of the permissible use of force.